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West fears the rise of some countries more 
than others  
December 9, 2013 6.19am GMT  
 
At ease: Indian soldiers deployed at the 2010 Commonwealth Games. John Giles/PA  
 
When a highly populous, rapidly developing, nuclear armed, space-voyaging and 
increasingly assertive Asian nation announces the purchase of its third aircraft carrier, a few 
months after launching its first domestically-produced nuclear submarine, a nervous reaction 
in the West may appear natural. 
After all, China’s economy has been growing rapidly for more than 30 years, allowing 
Beijing to enhance its military capabilities at a corresponding rate. Inevitably, this has drawn 
Western attention and China’s “rise” is now among the most hotly debated issues in global 
affairs – particularly at moments such as the latest Senkaku/Diaoyu islands incident.  
Is China a threat or an opportunity? Will it wield its new powers responsibly or for selfish 
gain? Questions like these circulate widely as Americans, Australians, Europeans and others 
watch China with cautious – and sometimes nervous – eyes.  
Consider this, though: the country which in November purchased its third aircraft carrier, and 
which earlier this year launched its first domestically built nuclear submarine was not China, 
but India. 
India is often regarded as today’s second “rising” power. It shares many attributes with China 
– notably a large, growing, modern and well-equipped military – and yet it rarely provokes 
anxiety in the West. The reasons for this warrant careful consideration. 
One of the club 
Broadly speaking, India is met with less suspicion because it is seen as more like “us”. 
English, in conjunction with Hindi, is the Indian language of government. India is democratic 
and capitalist and due to its regrettable colonial past it shares cultural and historical links to 
the United Kingdom and is a member of the Commonwealth. To a significant extent, it is 
“one of the club”.  
This affinity is evident in the West’s relations with India. In a speech to the Indian parliament 
in 2010 for example, US president Barack Obama emphasised “our shared interests and our 
shared values” (and variations of the word “democracy” appeared no fewer than 21 times). 
US politicians are more lukewarm when addressing China’s leaders, talking instead of 
“building trust” and “seeking common ground”. Similarly, in 2012, the then Australian prime 
minister, Julia Gillard, and India’s prime minister, Manmohan Singh, spoke of their nations’ 
common values as liberal democracies.  
The world’s democratic systems are of course not identical, but they are bound by the 
powerful myth that democracy is necessarily good. Correspondingly, any non-democratic 
system is implicitly identified as “bad”. History does not help the communist cause. Most 
infamously, the Soviet experiment descended into dictatorial violence and brutality. Yet 
communism, in its intended form, is not inherently evil. Moreover, a truly communist country 
has never actually existed and so technically, at least, it has no track record for us to assess. 
The communism we imagine is the key factor.  
Certainly, China has a dubious record of upholding human rights. At times it is highly 
assertive towards its neighbours; it engages in international “cyber warfare”; and it seems to 
have only recently begun caring to any meaningful extent about the environment within and 
beyond its borders, among other things. But China is far from alone. Other nations guilty of 
these crimes (at one time or another) include the United States, Australia, the UK – and India.  
Self-fulfilling prophecy 
Broadly speaking, China is doing little to demonstrate that it represents a major imminent 
security threat to the West, or even to its Asian neighbours. In the recent round of disputes 
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands China has acted aggressively and perhaps unreasonably, but 
the situation has a long and complex history. Moreover, the other key actor, Japan, has long 
enforced its own regional “Air Defence Identification Zone”, attracting claims of hypocrisy 
from China that went largely unreported in the West.  
Meanwhile, India consistently devotes a larger proportion of its GDP to its military than does 
China; for the past five years it has been the world’s largest importer of weapons, and it is 
expected to be the fourth largest military spender by 2020. Yet a new Indian aircraft carrier is 
immediately considered a welcome development, while in the case of China we are grimly 
told: “It’s not time to panic. Yet.” 
Importantly, the more we assume that China is a probable instigator of hostility and even war, 
the more we ready ourselves for that eventuality. Indeed, the “China factor” is used to justify 
efforts by India, as well as Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan and others, to bolster their defence 
capabilities, leading to increasing tensions across a highly sensitive region. The “China 
factor” has also been used to rationalise the United States’ recent “pivot” (or “rebalancing”) 
towards the Asia Pacific. China is becoming a bigger threat, the logic goes, so others should 
prepare.  
Yet we should also recognise the potential effects of an “India factor” in China and that the 
actions of others will not go unnoticed in Beijing. In consequence we risk trapping ourselves 
in a self-fulfilling prophecy of Chinese aggression. We may, in other words, end up literally 
imagining a threatening China into existence and through our ideas and actions become faced 
by the fictional demon we feared all along. 
In short, ideas matter, and not just in policy-making circles. China might declare war on 
others in the future. It might show intent of becoming that all-conquering superpower which 
successfully pushes Chinese culture and values upon the world and dictates global affairs. 
But it might not, and most experts agree that for various reasons this appears highly unlikely.  
The biggest danger is in expecting it to happen, as we welcome moves by other major powers 
to equip and arm themselves for an imagined worst case scenario. Put simply, we should not 
allow ourselves to be led by the fear of what might be. The disastrous and ill-conceived “War 
on Terror” showed us that hysteria over a fictitious enemy can reap terrible, destructive and 
long-lasting consequences. For now, China’s future (just like India’s) is unclear. In the West 
we should think twice before assuming we know otherwise. 
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